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NOTE 
FAILED INTERVENTIONS: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, HUMAN 
TRAFFICKING, AND THE CRIMINALIZATION OF SURVIVAL 
Alaina Richert* 
Over the last decade, state legislators have enacted statutes acknowledging the 
link between criminal behavior and trauma resulting from domestic violence 
and human trafficking. While these interventions take a step in the right di-
rection, they still have major shortcomings that prevent meaningful relief for 
survivor-defendants. Until now, there has been no systematic overview of the 
statutes that require courts to consider a defendant’s history of trauma in the 
contexts of domestic violence and human trafficking. There has also been no 
attempt to explore how these statutes relate to each other. This Note fills those 
gaps. It also identifies essential elements future statutory interventions in these 
contexts must include in order to grant effective relief to survivor-defendants. 
These reforms are essential to create a legal system that does not criminalize 
surviving domestic violence and human trafficking. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The legal system is failing criminal defendants who are survivors of do-
mestic violence and human trafficking. In recent years, studies have revealed 
that there are compelling links between trauma in these contexts and criminal 
behavior.1 Arresting, prosecuting, and incarcerating survivors who have com-
mitted crimes related to their abuse is itself a form of trauma. These actions treat 
survivors as criminals and expose them to an increased risk of experiencing 
physical or sexual violence.2 In addition, survivor-defendants3 who are con-
victed of offenses linked to their abuse are subject to the negative collateral con-
sequences that accompany criminal convictions, including barriers to securing 
housing, employment, public assistance, a driver’s license, and financial aid.4 
 
 1. Deborah W. Denno, How Courts in Criminal Cases Respond to Childhood Trauma, 
103 MARQ. L. REV. 301, 310–11 (2019). 
 2. Isabella Blizard, Chapter 636: Catching Those Who Fall, an Affirmative Defense for 
Human Trafficking Victims, 48 U. PAC. L. REV. 631, 646 (2017); Benjamin C. Hattem, Note, Car-
ceral Trauma and Disability Law, 72 STAN. L. REV. 995, 997–98 (2020) (reporting that almost all 
inmates witness violence during incarceration in addition to an increased risk of personally ex-
periencing physical or sexual violence). 
 3. Some use the term “victim defendant” when referring to people who experience bat-
tering and are criminally charged. This term aims to restore the empathy for a person’s experi-
ence of domestic violence and human trafficking that sometimes disappears when they are 
arrested. See SUE OSTHOFF & JANE SADUSKY, NAT’L CLEARINGHOUSE FOR THE DEF. OF BATTERED 
WOMEN, A TOOLKIT FOR SYSTEMS ADVOCACY ON BEHALF OF VICTIMS OF BATTERING CHARGED 
WITH CRIMES 5 (2016). But this Note uses the term “survivor-defendant” to acknowledge the 
resiliency shown by those who have survived domestic violence and human trafficking. 
 4. U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES: THE CROSSROADS OF 
PUNISHMENT, REDEMPTION, AND THE EFFECTS ON COMMUNITIES 1–3 (2019), https://www.usccr
.gov/pubs/2019/06-13-Collateral-Consequences.pdf [perma.cc/SRE3-HML2] (explaining that 
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Over the course of the last decade or so, legislators have enacted statutes 
that acknowledge the link between trauma and criminal behavior in the con-
text of domestic violence and human trafficking.5 Domestic violence is a pattern 
of emotional, physical, sexual, psychological, or economic abuse perpetrated 
by one household member against another.6 Intimate partner violence (IPV) 
is a type of domestic violence perpetrated by someone who is or wants to be 
in an intimate relationship with another person.7 Human trafficking is the use 
of coercion or fraud to obtain some kind of labor, including commercial sex 
acts.8 Since domestic violence, IPV, and human trafficking overlap, it is pos-
sible for someone to experience these forms of abuse simultaneously. 
 
the negative collateral consequences of conviction are increasingly impacting women, in addi-
tion to disproportionately impacting people of color, LGBTQ+ people, people with disabilities, 
and immigrants). 
 5. While some of the arguments in this Note may apply to other kinds of trauma, this 
Note focuses on domestic violence and human trafficking since that is where reform is most 
likely to occur in the short term. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that experiencing 
trauma is not limited to these contexts. There have been some reform efforts to make family and 
juvenile courts more trauma informed. Sara E. Gold, Trauma: What Lurks Beneath the Surface, 
24 CLINICAL L. REV. 201, 244 (2018); see, e.g., Trauma-Informed Courts, NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUV. 
& FAM. CT. JUDGES, https://www.ncjfcj.org/child-welfare-and-juvenile-law/trauma-informed-
courts [perma.cc/Z6M2-494P]. Those reforms, however, have been limited to specific contexts 
and have not been extended to the criminal justice system more broadly. Gold, supra, at 244. 
Research has shown that the majority of incarcerated men have experienced some kind of 
trauma, much of which is quite severe. Nancy Wolff, Jessica Huening, Jing Shi & B. Christopher 
Frueh, Trauma Exposure and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Among Incarcerated Men, 91 J. URB. 
HEALTH 707, 707, 713 (2014) (finding that 99% of incarcerated men have experienced some kind 
of trauma, including physical abuse, seeing someone seriously injured or killed, or seeing dead 
bodies other than at a funeral and that 64.2% have been attacked with a weapon). Further statu-
tory interventions should apply more broadly in order to move toward prison abolition and stop 
the criminalization of survival. 
 6. See What Is Domestic Abuse?, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/corona-
virus/what-is-domestic-abuse [perma.cc/D3BR-6XFW]. 
 7. See FAM. VIOLENCE PREVENTION FUND, NATIONAL CONSENSUS GUIDELINES ON 
IDENTIFYING AND RESPONDING TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMIZATION IN HEALTH CARE 
SETTINGS 2 (2004), https://www.futureswithoutviolence.org/userfiles/file/Consensus.pdf 
[perma.cc/Q4T6-UEJF]. While much IPV research focuses on women, this Note uses gender-
inclusive language wherever possible in recognition of the fact that LGBTQ+ couples experience 
IPV at a rate that is comparable to, or possibly higher than, heterosexual couples. E.g., Luca Rollè 
et al., When Intimate Partner Violence Meets Same Sex Couples: A Review of Same Sex Intimate 
Partner Violence, FRONTIERS PSYCH., Aug. 2018, at 1, 2; see also Mika Albright & DeAnn Alcan-
tara-Thompson, Contextualizing Domestic Violence from a LGBTQ Perspective, INTERSECTIONS 
PRACTICE (Nat’l Ass’n of Soc. Workers, Washington, D.C.), no. 5, 2011, at 11, https://www.so-
cialworkers.org/assets/secured/documents/sections/intersections/20116915434669_2011%20
Intersections%20in%20Practice.pdf [perma.cc/QUU2-UF5J] (noting dearth of research on how 
IPV affects those identifying as transgender, bisexual, queer, or genderqueer and summarizing 
research showing that IPV is as common in same-sex relationships as it is in heterosexual rela-
tionships). 
 8. See What Is Human Trafficking?, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
https://www.dhs.gov/blue-campaign/what-human-trafficking [perma.cc/M9Q7-MFCP]. 
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New York,9 California,10 and Illinois11 recently passed laws giving courts 
discretion to reduce sentences when a defendant’s offense is related to being 
subjected to domestic violence. In addition, thirty-eight states have passed af-
firmative defenses for human-trafficking survivor-defendants since 2010.12 
While these laws are a step in the right direction,13 they do not go far enough. 
They often impose restrictions that deny relief to survivor-defendants, such as 
excluding certain types of offenses or those that occurred before a specific pe-
riod. 
This Note undertakes the first systematic overview of all statutes that re-
quire courts to consider a defendant’s history of domestic violence or human 
trafficking and explores how these statutes are related. Part I explains how 
trauma induced by domestic violence or human trafficking may lead survivor-
defendants to commit criminal offenses. Part II provides an overview of all 
statutes that require courts to consider a defendant’s being subjected to do-
mestic violence and human trafficking. Part III compares these statutes, iden-
tifies their shortcomings, and proposes necessary elements of future statutory 
interventions. 
I. LINKS BETWEEN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, HUMAN TRAFFICKING, AND 
CRIMINAL OFFENSES 
People who experience domestic violence or human trafficking are at an 
increased risk of committing a criminal offense.14 For example, domestic-vi-
olence and human-trafficking survivor-defendants may commit a crime 
against their abuser in self-defense, be forced by their abuser or trafficker to 
 
 9. Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act, ch. 31, § 1, 2019 N.Y. Laws 144, 145–46 
(codified as amended at N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.12(1) (McKinney Supp. 2021)). 
 10. Act of Sept. 30, 2012, ch. 803, 2012 Cal. Stat. 6437 (codified as amended at CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 1473.5 (West Supp. 2021)); Act of Sept. 30, 2012, ch. 809, 2012 Cal. Stat. 6454 (codified 
as amended at CAL. PENAL CODE § 4801 (West 2021)). These statutes are known as the “Sin by 
Silence” laws. Victoria Law, When Abuse Victims Commit Crimes, ATLANTIC (May 21, 2019), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/05/new-york-domestic-violence-sentenc-
ing/589507 [perma.cc/CFE8-EZFQ]. 
 11. Act of May 25, 2015, Pub. Act 099-0384, 2015 Ill. Laws 5573 (codified at 730 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-3.1(a)(15) and 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1401 (2020)). 
 12. See infra note 93. 
 13. Statutes explicitly making a history of IPV or human trafficking relevant to a defend-
ant’s culpability are essential because existing defenses are often ill suited to addressing the kinds 
of crimes survivor-defendants commit. See Lauren Danice Shuman, Comment, Pulling the Trig-
ger: Shooting Down Mandatory Minimum Sentencing for Victims Who Kill Their Abuser, 56 
HOW. L.J. 983, 1003–06 (2013). 
 14. See, e.g., Emily M. Wright, Patricia Van Voorhis, Emily J. Salisbury & Ashley Bauman, 
Gender-Responsive Lessons Learned and Policy Implications for Women in Prison: A Review, 39 
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 1612, 1616 (2012). 
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steal or commit other crimes, or turn to substance abuse to manage the emo-
tional and physical pain caused by their abuse.15 This Part explores some of 
the pathways between the trauma of domestic violence and human trafficking 
and subsequent criminal behavior. Section I.A discusses the trauma experi-
enced by survivor-defendants in the contexts of domestic violence and human 
trafficking. Section I.B explores the unique paths between IPV and criminal 
behavior. Section I.C highlights the connections between childhood domestic 
violence and criminal behavior. These links have critical implications for fu-
ture statutory interventions and demonstrate how prosecuting and imprison-
ing survivor-defendants for their crimes effectively criminalizes survival. 
A. Domestic Violence, Human Trafficking, and Criminal Offenses 
The trauma of domestic violence and human trafficking affects people’s 
subsequent behavior and mental health and can lead to criminal behavior.16 
Perpetrators of domestic violence or human trafficking may force their vic-
tims17 to steal, participate in group crimes, take responsibility for their 
abuser’s crime, or commit some other criminal offense.18 Abusers in these 
contexts may force their victims to commit sex-related crimes.19 For example, 
Judy Norman, an IPV survivor-defendant who shot her abuser, was forced by 
 
 15. Dana D. DeHart, Pathways to Prison: Impact of Victimization in the Lives of Incarcer-
ated Women, 14 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1362, 1365, 1368 (2008); Wright et al., supra note 
14, at 1616. 
 16. Wright et al., supra note 14, at 1616; see also Nina Papalia, James R.P. Ogloff, Margaret 
Cutajar & Paul E. Mullen, Child Sexual Abuse and Criminal Offending: Gender-Specific Effects 
and the Role of Abuse Characteristics and Other Adverse Outcomes, 23 CHILD MALTREATMENT 
399 (2018) (finding that people who experience sexual abuse as children are more likely to en-
gage in criminal behavior of all kinds). According to Kathleen Daly, five pathways lead women 
to felony court: (1) substance-abuse and mental-health issues stemming from child abuse; (2) 
engaging in substance abuse, sex work, and other criminal activities after fleeing from an abusive 
home; (3) criminal activity directly attributable to intimate partner violence; (4) substance abuse 
in the context of intimate or familial relationships; and (5) other reasons. Kathleen Daly, 
Women’s Pathways to Felony Court: Feminist Theories of Lawbreaking and Problems of Repre-
sentation, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 11 (1992); see also Angela M. Moe, Blurring the 
Boundaries: Women’s Criminality in the Context of Abuse, 32 WOMEN’S STUD. Q., Fall/Winter 
2004, at 116 (explaining how engaging in criminal behavior is sometimes necessary to survive 
IPV); Carolina Villacampa & Núria Torres, Human Trafficking for Criminal Exploitation: Effects 
Suffered by Victims in Their Passage Through the Criminal Justice System, 25 INT’L REV. 
VICTIMOLOGY 3 (2019) (examining criminal exploitation associated with human trafficking, in-
cluding prostitution, growing drugs, and street crime). 
 17. In this Note, “victim” refers to a person who is experiencing ongoing illegal violence, 
such as domestic violence and human trafficking. 
 18. DeHart, supra note 15, at 1366. 
 19. See, e.g., DeHart, supra note 15, at 1365–66 (finding that many incarcerated women 
were forced by caregivers to sell sex as girls, which is a form of domestic violence, or by intimate 
partners, which is a form of IPV); What Is Human Trafficking?, supra note 8 (stating human 
trafficking involves “the use of force, fraud, or coercion to obtain some type of labor or commer-
cial sex act”). 
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her abuser to prostitute herself.20 Her abuser would beat and maim her if she 
refused or if he felt that she should have made more money.21 
People who experience domestic violence or human trafficking may also 
respond to the abuse by using violence to protect themselves or others.22 In 
one case, Catina Curley was subjected to nine years of severe, relentless abuse, 
including punching, slapping, and strangulation, by her husband Renaldo.23 
Renaldo dislocated her shoulder, attempted to push her out of a moving car, 
and gave her many black eyes and other facial injuries.24 During one incident, 
Renaldo followed Catina around the house, yelling at her, choking her, and 
throwing things at her in front of her daughter.25 When he went downstairs, 
Catina called her aunt for help, armed herself with a handgun, and begged 
Renaldo to let her leave the house. But Renaldo walked toward her, continuing 
even as Catina screamed, trembled, and told him to stop. Catina fired the gun, 
the bullet hit Renaldo, and he died from the wound within one or two minutes. 
Devastated, Catina called 911, but when the police arrived, she was arrested. 
Catina was found guilty of second-degree murder and sentenced to life in 
prison.26 
Beyond violent crimes, domestic-violence and human-trafficking survi-
vor-defendants may also commit crimes when they use controlled substances 
to manage their trauma.27 People who experience domestic violence or human 
trafficking often use controlled substances to cope with mental-health prob-
lems or the physical and emotional pain that results from past and present 
 
 20. State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 9–10 (N.C. 1989). 
 21. Id. at 10. 
 22. MELISSA E. DICHTER WITH SUE OSTHOFF, VAWNET, WOMEN’S EXPERIENCES OF 
ABUSE AS A RISK FACTOR FOR INCARCERATION: A RESEARCH UPDATE 4 (2015), https://vawnet
.org/sites/default/files/materials/files/2016-09/AR_IncarcerationUpdate.pdf [perma.cc/D7WX-
AK84]; see also DeHart, supra note 15, at 1365–66; Justine van der Leun, “No Choice but to Do 
It”: Why Women Go to Prison, NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 17, 2020), https://newrepublic.com/arti-
cle/160589/women-prison-domestic-violence-survivors [perma.cc/XZ48-RMQG] (“[A]t least 
30 percent of those serving time on murder or manslaughter charges were protecting themselves 
or a loved one from physical or sexual violence.”). 
 23. State v. Curley, No. 461-907, slip op. at *1, *4 (La. Crim. Dist. Ct. Orleans Parish Mar. 
1, 2019), https://www.theadvocate.com/pdf_8cefde3e-3c67-11e9-a28c-6fff990c939c.html 
[perma.cc/UH8J-G5AV]. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at *2. 
 26. Id. 
 27. It might be suggested that offenses fit into “direct” and “collateral” categories, where 
direct offenses are those compelled by an abuser, such as engaging in self-defense, and collateral 
offenses are those that seem more removed, such as turning to substances to cope with the phys-
ical and emotional pain of abuse. But this is not a useful framework for two reasons. First, this 
distinction breaks down when considered in the context of trauma resulting from domestic vi-
olence or human trafficking. It does not make sense to say some offenses are more direct than 
others when all the pathways are inextricably linked to abuse and the survivor-defendant’s culpa-
bility is lessened because of the abuse in all cases. Second, the two categories do not comport with 
existing state law. Most of the human-trafficking and domestic-violence statutes do not even cover 
all the “direct” results of abuse, such as being forced to steal by an abuser. See infra Part II. 
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abuse.28 For example, Laura, an incarcerated survivor,29 became an alcoholic 
when she was fifteen after using alcohol to cope with domestic violence from 
her stepfather.30 To numb the pain of her abuse, she would drink large 
amounts of vodka when she saw her stepfather preparing to sexually abuse 
her.31 Relatedly, abusers sometimes pressure their victims into using drugs or 
alcohol as a way to control them.32 For example, abusers may force victims to 
use drugs or alcohol so they are less able to resist, or they may want them to 
become addicted so that victims are incentivized to stay with them when they 
promise to supply more drugs or alcohol.33 
The majority of incarcerated women have experienced these kinds of 
trauma.34 Female prisoners report experiencing abuse before incarceration at 
a higher rate than male prisoners.35 For example, one study found that 60% of 
women in prison have experienced domestic violence.36 Women in jail have 
experienced domestic violence at similar rates: 86% of them have experienced 
sexual violence at some point in their lives, 77% have experienced IPV, and 
60% have experienced domestic violence by a caregiver.37 Multiple studies 
asking more comprehensive, behavior-specific questions have found that 
71%–95% of incarcerated women have experienced physical violence at the 
hands of an intimate partner.38 This is much higher than the national average 
of one in four women being abused by their intimate partner at some point in 
 
 28. Wright et al., supra note 14, at 1616. In addition to being prosecuted for their own use 
of controlled substances, domestic-violence and human-trafficking survivor-defendants may be 
disproportionately prosecuted for child abuse or endangerment for using controlled substances 
while pregnant, since they use controlled substances at higher rates. See CATHARINE A. 
MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 1479–83 (3d ed. 2016). In the context of IPV, many studies show 
female IPV survivors are more likely to use controlled substances than women who have not 
experienced IPV. ECHO A. RIVERA ET AL., NAT’L CTR. ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, TRAUMA & 
MENTAL HEALTH, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AND 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE 3–4 (2015), http://www.nationalcenterdvtraumamh.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2014/09/IPV-SAB-Final202.29.1620NO20LOGO-1.pdf [perma.cc/48BL-VJ6Z]. Research 
suggests domestic violence has similar effects. DICHTER, supra note 22, at 5. And according to a 
comprehensive study of human trafficking in the United States, 84.3% of human-trafficking sur-
vivors used controlled substances while being trafficked. Laura J. Lederer & Christopher A. Wet-
zel, The Health Consequences of Sex Trafficking and Their Implications for Identifying Victims in 
Healthcare Facilities, ANNALS HEALTH L., Winter 2014, at 61, 76. 
 29. In this Note, “survivor” refers to someone who has survived abuse and is not a de-
fendant. 
 30. DeHart, supra note 15, at 1368. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Lederer & Wetzel, supra note 28, at 75–76. 
 33. Hanni Stoklosa, Marti MacGibbon & Joseph Stoklosa, Human Trafficking, Mental Ill-
ness, and Addiction: Avoiding Diagnostic Overshadowing, 19 AMA J. ETHICS 23, 25–26 (2017). 
 34. OSTHOFF & SADUSKY, supra note 3, at 19–20. 
 35. Wright et al., supra note 14, at 1616. 
 36. Id. 
 37. ELIZABETH SWAVOLA, KRISTINE RILEY & RAM SUBRAMANIAN, VERA INST. OF JUST., 
OVERLOOKED: WOMEN AND JAILS IN AN ERA OF REFORM 11 (2016). 
 38. OSTHOFF & SADUSKY, supra note 3, at 20. 
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their lives.39 The trauma associated with domestic violence often goes unde-
tected and unaddressed during a survivor’s entire period of incarceration.40 
B. IPV and Criminal Offenses 
There are also many unique ways that IPV causes victims to be criminally 
charged, such as abusers’ manipulation of the criminal justice system, unjust 
enforcement of kidnapping laws, failure to protect laws, and economic abuse. 
For example, abusers often falsely accuse their victims of criminal activity as 
retaliation for victims reporting their abuse to the police.41 In other IPV cases, 
abusers have convinced the police that the victim was the primary aggressor 
in the relationship, thus creating bias in the criminal justice system against the 
victim.42 
IPV survivor-defendants may also be convicted of kidnapping for taking 
their children with them when fleeing an abusive relationship.43 Mothers leav-
ing with their children are more likely to be fleeing abuse than fathers who 
leave with children, and fathers are more likely to demonstrate controlling be-
havior over mothers.44 Yet while fathers kidnap their children at a higher rate 
than mothers, mothers are convicted of parental kidnapping more often than 
fathers.45 
IPV survivor-defendants are also often criminalized for failing to protect 
their children from harm at the hands of their abuser.46 A severe gender dis-
parity exists in this context as well: almost all defendants who are convicted of 
failure to protect children are female.47 For example, survivor-defendant 
Shantonio Hunter was sentenced to twenty-eight years in prison on a failure-
 
 39. SHARON G. SMITH ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, THE 
NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY: 2015 DATA BRIEF – UPDATED 
RELEASE 7 (2018). 
 40. SWAVOLA ET AL., supra note 37, at 11. 
 41. DICHTER, supra note 22, at 5. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Courtney Cross, Criminalizing Battered Mothers, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 259, 260. 
 44. Id. at 262. 
 45. Id. at 261–62. 
 46. Amanda Mahoney, Note, How Failure to Protect Laws Punish the Vulnerable, 29 
HEALTH MATRIX 429, 431 (2019). See generally DEBRA WHITCOMB, CHILDREN AND DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE: THE PROSECUTOR’S RESPONSE (2004), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/199721
.pdf [perma.cc/LVP4-DLYZ] (finding that 78% of prosecutors in states with failure-to-protect 
laws would prosecute a mother for failing to protect her child from abuse by a perpetrator who 
was abusing both the mother and the child). 
 47. Jeanne A. Fugate, Note, Who’s Failing Whom? A Critical Look at Failure-to-Protect 
Laws, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 272, 274 (2001). 
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to-protect theory when her abusive boyfriend killed her three-year-old son.48 
In this way, Shantonio was convicted for the actions of her abusive partner. 
Economic control is often part of IPV since it provides abusers with more 
power over their victims.49 Abusers may restrict the ability of their victims to 
work, forcing survivor-defendants to turn to criminal behavior to gain eco-
nomic resources and financial independence.50 For example, a study of incar-
cerated survivors found that some had been fired from their jobs after being 
stalked or harassed by their abuser at the workplace and that others were 
forced to leave their jobs by controlling partners.51 
C. Childhood Domestic Violence and Criminal Offenses 
There are clear connections between experiencing domestic violence as a 
child and criminality.52 Experiencing DV does not necessarily mean a child 
will become a delinquent or adult offender, but it increases the risk.53 Victims 
of childhood trauma, including domestic violence, are more likely to commit 
a criminal offense in the future.54 Children who experience trauma see the 
 
 48. See Victoria Law, Convicted as a Teenager, Abuse Survivor Cyntoia Brown May Have 
the Chance to Leave Prison (Updated), REWIRE NEWS GRP. (May 23, 2018, 12:23 PM), https://re-
wirenewsgroup.com/article/2018/05/23/convicted-as-a-teenager-abuse-survivor-cyntoia-
brown-may-have-the-chance-to-leave-prison [perma.cc/S7ZC-3GQN]. 
 49. Shamita Das Dasgupta, Just Like Men? A Critical View of Violence by Women, in 
COORDINATING COMMUNITY RESPONSES TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: LESSONS FROM DULUTH 
AND BEYOND 195, 200 (Melanie F. Shepard & Ellen L. Pence eds., 1999). 
 50. DICHTER, supra note 22, at 5–6. 
 51. DeHart, supra note 15, at 1373. 
 52. Mirko Bagaric, Gabrielle Wolf & Peter Isham, Trauma and Sentencing: The Case for 
Mitigating Penalty for Childhood Physical and Sexual Abuse, 30 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 33 
(2019). So far, only the New York domestic-violence law has the potential to address childhood 
domestic violence. See infra Section II.C. But the far-reaching implications of experiencing do-
mestic violence as a child have important ramifications for future statutory interventions. Spe-
cifically, they imply that the relief should not be limited based on when the abuse occurred. See 
infra Section III.D. 
 53. Joanne Belknap & Kristi Holsinger, An Overview of Delinquent Girls: How Theory and 
Practice Have Failed and the Need for Innovative Changes, in FEMALE OFFENDERS: CRITICAL 
PERSPECTIVES AND EFFECTIVE INTERVENTIONS 3, 8 (Ruth T. Zaplin ed., 2d ed. 2008) (discussing 
many recent studies finding that 40%–73% of delinquent girls have experienced sexual or phys-
ical abuse); see also Tina Maschi, Unraveling the Link Between Trauma and Male Delinquency: 
The Cumulative Versus Differential Risk Perspectives, 51 SOC. WORK 59, 66–67 (2006) (reporting 
that experiencing trauma increases the likelihood that boys will become delinquents); Pathways 
Between Child Maltreatment and Adult Criminal Involvement, NAT’L INST. OF JUST. (Oct. 11, 
2017) https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/pathways-between-child-maltreatment-and-adult-
criminal-involvement [perma.cc/LE5J-EZT6] (reporting that experiencing childhood trauma 
increases the likelihood that boys will engage in criminal behavior as adults). 
 54. See, e.g., Denno, supra note 1, at 311; see also Margaret F. Brinig & Marsha Garrison, 
The Invisible Prison: Pathways and Prevention, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1439, 1481 (2020) (not-
ing that childhood trauma is prevalent among incarcerated men, with over 25% of them being 
abandoned in childhood or adolescence, 42% having witnessed someone being killed, and over 
50% experiencing physical trauma). 
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world as a place of danger and are overloaded by stress hormones.55 When 
coupled with a lack of trust in adults, the harms associated with trauma can 
cause children to fall behind in school and inhibit them from developing 
healthy relationships with peers or teachers.56 Children who run away from 
home to escape abuse may be criminalized for their survival strategies of de-
linquency, substance abuse, theft, or prostitution.57 Arrest, prosecution, and 
incarceration are themselves traumatizing, compounding the problem instead 
of solving it.58 
The harmful effects of domestic violence create a pathway from childhood 
trauma to criminal behavior.59 For example, in Oregon’s juvenile justice sys-
tem alone, 93% of girls have been sexually or physically abused.60 Research 
shows high rates in other states as well.61 Of all the women currently serving 
life sentences for crimes committed as juveniles, 80% are survivors of physical 
abuse and 77% are survivors of sexual abuse.62 Routing abused girls into the 
justice system retraumatizes them and compounds the original harm.63 Girls 
of color are disproportionately affected: Black girls comprise 33.2% of de-
tained and committed girls, despite making up only 14% of the population of 
girls in the United States.64 LGBTQ+ girls are also disproportionately affected, 
comprising 13%–15% of youth involved with the juvenile justice system but 
just 5%–7% of the general population.65 
II. EXISTING STATUTORY APPROACHES 
This Part begins by examining self-defense and duress, the two affirma-
tive defenses traditionally available in criminal trials, and argues that they are 
inadequate to prevent the unjust criminalization of survivor-defendants. It 
then looks to statutes that have been passed in the last decade to address 
trauma from domestic violence and human trafficking. This exercise serves to 
 
 55. Susan Ayres, Trauma-Informed Advocacy: Learning to Empathize with Unspeakable 
Horrors, 26 WM. & MARY J. RACE GENDER & SOC. JUST. 225, 230 (2020). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Belknap & Holsinger, supra note 53, at 7–8. 
 58. Miriam S. Gohara, In Defense of the Injured: How Trauma-Informed Criminal Defense 
Can Reform Sentencing, 45 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 16–17 (2018); see also LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 
725 (2014) (“[A]rresting, prosecuting, and incarcerating victimized children serves to re-trau-
matize them and to increase their feelings of low self-esteem, which only makes the process of 
recovery more difficult.”). 
 59. Some have called this the “girls’ sexual abuse to prison pipeline.” E.g., MALIKA SAADA 
SAAR, REBECCA EPSTEIN, LINDSAY ROSENTHAL & YASMIN VAFA, GEO. CTR. ON POVERTY & 
INEQ., THE SEXUAL ABUSE TO PRISON PIPELINE: THE GIRLS’ STORY 5 (2015). 
 60. Id. at 7. 
 61. Id. at 7, 9. 
 62. The Sent’g Project, Women and Life Imprisonment Webinar, YOUTUBE (July 11, 
2019), https://youtu.be/m9qpocC4qlo. 
 63. See SAAR ET AL., supra note 59, at 12. 
 64. Id. at 7. 
 65. Id. 
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catalogue all current existing legislative approaches to trauma in these con-
texts and sets up the comparative analysis in Part III. 
A. Inadequate Alternatives 
As discussed in Part I, survivor-defendants often commit crimes to de-
fend themselves from further abuse or because they are being controlled and 
manipulated by their abuser.66 Therefore, many attempt to raise an affirmative 
defense (i.e., argue that a special circumstance negates their culpability) at 
trial.67 Self-defense and duress are two of the most relevant affirmative de-
fenses.68 A self-defense claim asserts that one’s use of force was necessary and 
proportional to protect oneself against unlawful force by another.69 The duress 
defense asserts that one’s criminal conduct was the result of coercion by the 
use or threat of unlawful force by another.70 
But it is difficult for domestic-violence and human-trafficking survivor-
defendants to successfully assert self-defense or duress defenses in court be-
cause both defenses require defendants to prove they had a reasonable belief 
that they were in “imminent” danger of death or serious bodily harm when 
they committed the crime of which they were accused.71 People subjected to 
domestic violence and human trafficking do not often kill their abusers in sit-
uations that reflect standard notions of imminent physical danger.72 Survivor-
defendants are thus unlikely to successfully assert self-defense, even if they 
lived with the threat of imminent danger of great bodily harm—or even 
death—every day for years.73 For example, in State v. Norman, the survivor-
defendant’s husband beat and tortured her for approximately twenty years.74 
He also forced her to sell sex.75 She attempted to escape several times but was 
caught and brutally beaten each time.76 He made many threats to kill her if she 
ever tried to go to the police or leave him.77 After twenty years of continuous 
 
 66. See supra Part I. 
 67. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 913 F.3d 807, 811 (9th Cir. 2019) (asserting duress 
against charge of buying a gun for an abusive ex-boyfriend); State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 9–
10 (N.C. 1989) (asserting self-defense against charge of murdering an abusive husband). 
 68. See Francisco Zornosa, Protecting Human Trafficking Victims from Punishment and 
Promoting Their Rehabilitation: The Need for an Affirmative Defense, 22 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & 
SOC. JUST. 177, 188–89 (2016); Sharon Angella Allard, Essay, Rethinking Battered Woman Syn-
drome: A Black Feminist Perspective, 1 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 191 (1991). 
 69. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (AM. L. INST. 1962). 
 70. See id. 
 71. Zornosa, supra note 68, at 188; see Allard, supra note 68, at 193. 
 72. See Allard, supra note 68, at 193. 
 73. MACKINNON, supra note 28, at 838–39. 
 74. See 378 S.E.2d 8, 10 (N.C. 1989). 
 75. Norman, 378 S.E.2d at 10. 
 76. Id. at 11. 
 77. Id. at 10. 
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abuse, the survivor-defendant shot her abuser while he slept.78 The court re-
jected her self-defense claim because it did not think the imminence prong 
was met, despite the evidence that she had tried to leave numerous times.79 
Another reason survivor-defendants often fail to successfully prove self-
defense is because anyone classified as an “aggressor,” or someone who insti-
gated the actions immediately leading to the violence in question, cannot 
claim self-defense.80 This limitation prevents consideration of domestic vio-
lence or human trafficking as a mitigating factor when a survivor-defendant 
who has been repeatedly abused eventually takes action against their abuser. 
It is particularly difficult for Black women to convince a court that they acted 
in self-defense because of stereotypes that portray Black women as angry, 
strong, and assertive.81 
Lastly, courts have typically required survivor-defendants pleading self-
defense to show that they retreated before using force, even if they committed 
a crime because of IPV in their own home.82 But this requirement ignores the 
reality that many IPV victims cannot escape without risking great violence or 
death.83 Women are seventy times more likely to be killed by their abusers 
within two weeks of leaving the relationship than at any other time in the re-
lationship.84 This statistic demonstrates that many victims of IPV are unable 
to safely retreat from abuse, which means courts are forcing IPV victims to 
choose between risking their life to retreat and being able to plead self-defense 
for any crimes committed in the course of protecting themselves. 
In addition, many victims of IPV suffer over time from a psychological 
phenomenon called “learned helplessness,” where victims may stop seeking to 
escape since doing so seems futile.85 Learned helplessness makes it less likely 
that a survivor-defendant will retreat from ongoing violence, which makes as-
serting self-defense more difficult. Self-defense assumes that people in danger 
will be able to remove themselves from violent situations, which is not the case 
for many IPV victims. This leaves IPV survivor-defendants without a defense 
if they commit any offense while protecting themselves. 
 
 78. Id. at 9. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:21 (2016). 
 81. See Allard, supra note 68, at 195–98. 
 82. Cristina Georgiana Messerschmidt, Comment, A Victim of Abuse Should Still Have a 
Castle: The Applicability of the Castle Doctrine to Instances of Domestic Violence, 106 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 593, 598, 610, 617 (2016) (explaining that this is currently hotly debated and 
that eight states even specify that victims of IPV must retreat before using deadly force). 
 83. Jeannie Suk, The True Woman: Scenes from the Law of Self-Defense, 31 HARV. J.L. & 
GENDER 237, 253–54 (2008). 
 84. Messerschmidt, supra note 82, at 620. 
 85. Suk, supra note 83, at 257. Regardless of whether one believes in battered woman syn-
drome, which highlights the psychological implications of cycles of abuse, or survivor theory, 
which emphasizes the agency and conscious choices of those who experience IPV, both theories 
make it clear that abused women do not believe they can successfully leave abusive relationships. 
Messerschmidt, supra note 82, at 598, 620–24. 
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Duress defenses often fail for similar reasons. Again, duress requires a 
showing of “imminent” physical harm that is difficult for survivor-defendants 
to meet. Duress does not apply to survivor-defendants who commit crimes 
due to threats of nonphysical harm, fear of past patterns of violence reoccur-
ring, or an extremely imbalanced power dynamic between the survivor-de-
fendant and the abuser.86 For example, in the case of human trafficking, 
abusers “groom” victims to commit criminal offenses through extensive sex-
ual and physical abuse, facilitating dependency on drugs, confiscating docu-
ments, threatening to call the police and report past forced criminal behavior, 
and similar techniques.87 In the case of undocumented victims, traffickers also 
use threats of nonphysical harm like deportation.88 Survivor-defendants who 
experience these forms of coercion cannot raise a duress defense because they 
do not pose a threat of imminent physical harm.89 
B. Human-Trafficking Statutes 
Since 2010, state legislatures have become increasingly aware of the links 
between domestic violence, human trafficking, and criminal behavior. In re-
sponse, thirty-eight states have passed laws providing affirmative defenses to 
human-trafficking survivor-defendants. This Section provides a brief over-
view of the various human-trafficking statutes, highlighting the differing ap-
proaches legislatures have taken to address the impact of trauma in these 
contexts. 
Statutes providing relief to human-trafficking survivor-defendants are 
much more numerous than domestic-violence statutes.90 Human-trafficking 
statutes also have a slightly longer history; the first human-trafficking statute 
appeared in 2005,91 whereas the first domestic-violence statute did not appear 
until 2012.92 Unlike domestic-violence statutes, human-trafficking statutes 
provide survivor-defendants with an affirmative defense. Currently, thirty-
eight states have affirmative defenses for human-trafficking survivor-defend-
ants.93 All these laws include one or more of the following restrictions on when 
 
 86. See Zornosa, supra note 68, at 188. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 188–89. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See infra notes 93, 107–123 and accompanying text. 
 91. Act of Apr. 26, 2005, ch. 77, § 1, 2005 N.J. Laws 318, 319 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 2C:13-8(c) (West 2015)). 
 92. Governor Signs Both Sin by Silence Bills, THE SIN BY SILENCE BILLS (Oct. 2, 2012) 
[hereinafter Sin by Silence Bills], https://legislation.sinbysilence.com/lastest-news-updates/gov-
ernor-signs-both-sin-by-silence-bills [perma.cc/3WYM-Y96X]; see also infra Section II.C. 
 93. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-159 (LexisNexis 2015); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3214(D) 
(2018); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-70-102 (Lexis through 2021 Reg. Sess.); CAL. PENAL CODE § 236.23 
(West Supp. 2021); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-504(2.5) (2020); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-82(b) 
(2020); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 787(h) (2021); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-6(b) (2019); 720 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/11-14(c-5) (2020); IOWA CODE § 710A.3 (2021); KAN. STAT. ANN § 21-6419(c) 
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the defense can be invoked: (1) restrictions based on the offense committed, 
(2) a nexus requirement, (3) a coercion requirement, and (4) a temporal re-
quirement. 
The most common limitation is based on the type of offense the survivor-
defendant committed. Twenty-seven states limit the defense to charges of 
prostitution or sex-related crimes.94 Although the eleven other states have 
broader affirmative-defense statutes that apply beyond sex-related crimes, six 
of them still limit the kinds of offenses that are eligible.95 Of those six, two 
states limit the defense to situations in which the survivor-defendant is 
charged with human trafficking.96 The four others only apply to nonviolent 
felonies, which are sometimes specified in the statute.97 
The eleven states that apply the human-trafficking defense in cases other 
than prostitution and sex-related crimes also limit the defense in other ways 
 
(Supp. 2019); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 529.170 (LexisNexis 2014); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:46.2(F) 
(Supp. 2021); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 853(3), 853-A(4) (Supp. 2020); MD. CODE ANN., 
CRIM. LAW § 11-306(c) (LexisNexis 2021); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 57 (2020); MINN. STAT. 
§ 609.325(4) (2020); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-54.1(5) (2020); MO. REV. STAT. § 566.223 (2016); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-710 (2019); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-801(3), -831(3) (2016 & Supp. 
2020); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 645:2(IV) (Supp. 2020); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-8(c) (West 
2015); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.01 (McKinney Supp. 2021); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-43.16 (2019); 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-41-13 (Supp. 2017); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 748(D) (Supp. 2020); OR. 
REV. STAT. § 163.269 (2019); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3019(b) (West 2015); 11 R.I. 
GEN. LAWS § 11-67.1-16 (Supp. 2020); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-2020 (Supp. 2020); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 22-23-1.2 (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-513(e) (2018); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 
§ 43.02 (West Supp. 2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2652(c) (2018); WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 9A.88.040 (2020); WIS. STAT. § 939.46(1m) (2019–2020); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-708 (2021). 
 94. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-159; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3214(D); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-
70-102; COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-504(2.5); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-82; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, 
§ 787; GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-6(b); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-14(c-5); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
6419(c); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:46.2(F); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 853(3), 853-A(4); MD. 
CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 11-306(c); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 57; MINN. STAT. § 609.325(4); 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-54.1(5); MO. REV. STAT. § 566.223; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-801(3), -831(3); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 645:2(IV); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-8(c); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.01; 18 
PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3019(b); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-67.1-16; S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 22-23-1.2; TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-513(e); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.02; VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 13, § 2652(c); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.88.040. 
 95. CAL. PENAL CODE § 236.23; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 529.170; MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-
5-710; N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-41-13; OR. REV. STAT. § 163.269; S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-2020. 
 96. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-43.16; OR. REV. STAT. § 163.269. 
 97. CAL. PENAL CODE § 236.23 (stating the defense does not apply to survivor-defendants 
who are charged with violent and serious felonies, as defined elsewhere, or human trafficking); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 529.170 (excluding capital offenses, Class A felonies, and Class B felonies 
involving the death, rape or sodomy, or serious physical injury of the victim); MONT. CODE ANN. 
§ 45-5-710 (stating that only nonviolent offenses are covered, which are not defined); N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 12.1-41-13 (enumerating a list of offenses that are eligible for the affirmative de-
fense, none of which are violent). See generally Zornosa, supra note 68, at 200 (pointing out that 
Kentucky’s statute protects more human-trafficking survivor-defendants who are forced to 
commit crimes by their abusers since it is not limited to sex-related crimes). 
November 2021] Failed Interventions 329 
besides limiting the kinds of offenses that are eligible.98 One common limita-
tion is a nexus requirement, under which the defendant must show a direct 
relationship between the trafficking and the crime. Statutes vary in their exact 
wording, but all require the survivor-defendant to show that their criminal 
offense was a “direct result” of their status as a then-victim of human traffick-
ing.99 For example, the Wyoming affirmative defense specifies that “[a] victim 
of human trafficking is not criminally liable for any commercial sex act or 
other criminal acts committed as a direct result of, or incident to, being a vic-
tim of human trafficking . . . .”100 
A few of the eleven broader state statutes also have a coercion require-
ment.101 For example, the California statute provides an affirmative defense 
when “the person was coerced to commit the offense as a direct result of being 
a human trafficking victim . . . and had a reasonable fear of harm.”102 The sim-
ilarly worded Iowa statute also requires that the compulsion include a threat 
of serious injury.103 
Two of the eleven broader statutes require that the offense have been 
committed while the survivor-defendant was a victim of human trafficking.104 
The temporal requirement is the only limit in the Oklahoma statute, which is 
otherwise written very broadly.105 It applies to human-trafficking survivor-
defendants charged with any offense and does not contain a nexus or coercion 
requirement.106 
 
 98. CAL. PENAL CODE § 236.23; IOWA CODE § 710A.3; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 529.170; 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-710; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-43.16; N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-41-13; 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 748(D); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.269; S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-2020; WIS. STAT. 
§ 939.46(1m); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-708. 
 99. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 236.23; IOWA CODE § 710A.3; MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-710; 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-41-13; S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-2020; WIS. STAT. § 939.46(1m); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 6-2-708. 
 100. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-708(a). 
 101. CAL. PENAL CODE § 236.23; IOWA CODE § 710A.3. 
 102. CAL. PENAL CODE § 236.23(a); see also Jessica Aycock, Criminalizing the Victim: End-
ing Prosecution of Human Trafficking Victims, CRIM. L. PRAC., Fall 2019, at 5, 10–11. 
 103. IOWA CODE § 710A.3 (“It shall be an affirmative defense . . . to a prosecution for a 
criminal violation directly related to the defendant’s status as a victim of [human trafficking], 
that the defendant committed the violation under compulsion by another’s threat of serious in-
jury, provided that the defendant reasonably believed that such injury was imminent.”); see also 
Allison L. Cross, Comment, Slipping Through the Cracks: The Dual Victimization of Human-
Trafficking Survivors, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 395, 407 (2013) (arguing that the Iowa statute can 
only be applied in a narrow range of circumstances since it contains a nexus requirement and 
requires that the offense be committed under coercion). 
 104. CAL. PENAL CODE § 236.23; OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 748(D) (Supp. 2020). 
 105. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 748(D); see also Meghan Hilborn, Note, How Oklahoma’s Hu-
man Trafficking Victim Defense Is Poised to Be the Boldest Stand Against Human Trafficking in 
the Country, 54 TULSA L. REV. 457, 458 (2019) (“Oklahoma’s trafficking-victim defense is the 
broadest response to human trafficking in the country . . . .”). 
 106. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 748(D). 
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Altogether, the offense-based limitations, the nexus requirement, the co-
ercion requirement, and the temporal requirement restrict survivor-defend-
ants’ ability to use these statutory affirmative defenses, leaving many of them 
at risk of conviction and retraumatization by the criminal justice system. 
C. Domestic-Violence Statutes 
While most states have adopted human-trafficking affirmative-defense 
statutes, only California, Illinois, and New York have passed laws explicitly 
acknowledging the link between criminal offenses and domestic violence. One 
critical difference between domestic-violence and human-trafficking statutes 
is that the latter provide affirmative defenses while the domestic-violence stat-
utes do not. The domestic-violence statutes apply only at the sentencing stage 
or afterwards, and most of them provide only for state post-conviction review. 
The domestic-violence statutes differ not only from human-trafficking 
statutes but also among themselves. For example, the statutes provide eligibil-
ity for different crimes and provide different types of relief to survivor-defend-
ants. And while some apply to all forms of domestic violence, others apply 
only to IPV. Since IPV is a specific kind of domestic violence, statutes about 
domestic violence apply to IPV survivor-defendants, but statutes about IPV 
do not apply to all domestic-violence survivor-defendants. This Section out-
lines the California, Illinois, and New York statutes and provides comparisons 
between them. 
1. IPV Statutes 
In 2012, the California legislature passed the “Sin by Silence” bills,107 
named after a documentary film that drew attention to the injustice that IPV 
survivor-defendants face in the criminal justice system.108 Section 1473.5 of 
the California Penal Code now permits IPV survivor-defendants to file for a 
writ of habeas corpus if they show that competent and substantial expert tes-
timony about IPV would have affected the outcome of their trial but was not 
presented to the finder of fact.109 And section 4801 requires parole boards to 
give “great weight” to any evidence that the prisoner experienced IPV and to 
consider the effects of the abuse on the prisoner at the time of the offense.110 
It also prohibits parole boards from denying parole based on a finding that the 
prisoner “lacks insight” into their crime when the board is presented with ev-
idence of IPV.111 The two laws were intended to provide greater justice to IPV 
 
 107. Act of Sept. 30, 2012, ch. 803, 2012 Cal. Stat. 6437 (codified as amended at CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 1473.5 (West Supp. 2021)); Act of Sept. 30, 2012, ch. 809, 2012 Cal. Stat. 6454 (codified 
as amended at CAL. PENAL CODE § 4801 (West 2021)). 
 108. Sin by Silence Bills, supra note 92. 
 109. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473.5(a) (West Supp. 2021). 
 110. Id. § 4801(b)(1) (West 2021). 
 111. Id. § 4801(b)(3). 
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survivor-defendants by giving them the opportunity to tell courts and parole 
boards about the abuse they experienced.112 
In 2015, the Illinois legislature passed Public Act 099-0384, which allows 
for resentencing of some IPV survivors currently serving jail or prison sen-
tences.113 To qualify for resentencing, the survivor must satisfy several factors: 
(1) the survivor was convicted of a forcible felony related to having been a 
victim of domestic violence perpetrated by an intimate partner (a nexus re-
quirement),114 (2) no evidence of IPV was presented at the sentencing hearing, 
(3) the survivor was unaware of the mitigating nature of evidence of IPV at 
the time of sentencing, and (4) the new evidence must be likely to change the 
original sentence.115 Thus, both the California and the Illinois statutes apply 
only to IPV survivor-defendants after conviction, but the requirements survi-
vor-defendants must satisfy to be considered for relief differ. 
2. Domestic-Violence Statutes 
Illinois Public Act 099-0384 also gives domestic-violence survivor-de-
fendants the opportunity to present their past abuse as a mitigating factor dur-
ing sentencing.116 The statute provides that if the defendant was or had been 
a victim of domestic violence and if the effects of that abuse tended to excuse 
or justify the defendant’s criminal conduct, then the survivor-defendant’s ex-
periences should weigh in favor of withholding or minimizing a sentence.117 
Public Act 099-0384 also includes a temporal limitation: the defendant must 
have been a victim of domestic violence at the time of the offense.118 
In 2019, the New York legislature passed the Domestic Violence Survivors 
Justice Act (DVSJA), which gives courts discretion to give lower sentences, 
reduce the sentences of some currently incarcerated survivor-defendants, and 
 
 112. Sin by Silence Bills, supra note 92. 
 113. Act of May 25, 2015, Pub. Act 099-0384, § 10, 2015 Ill. Laws 5573, 5574–75 (codified 
at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1401 (2020)). 
 114. Although this statute uses the term domestic violence, it is really talking about IPV 
since the abuse must be perpetrated by an intimate partner. The statute defines intimate partner 
as “a spouse or former spouse, persons who have or allegedly have had a child in common, or 
persons who have or have had a dating or engagement relationship.” 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-
1401(b-5) (2020). 
 115. Id.. 
 116. Act of May 25, 2015, Pub. Act 099-0384, § 5, 2015 Ill. Laws 5573 (codified at 730 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-3.1(a)(15) (2020)). 
 117. Id. This statute applies to domestic violence more broadly, not just IPV. It defines 
domestic violence to “include spouses, former spouses, parents, children, stepchildren and other 
persons related by blood or by present or prior marriage, persons who share or formerly shared 
a common dwelling, persons who have or allegedly have a child in common, persons who share 
or allegedly share a blood relationship through a child, persons who have or have had a dating 
or engagement relationship, persons with disabilities and their personal assistants, and caregiv-
ers.” 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/103 (2020). 
 118. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-3.1 (2020). 
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resentence survivor-defendants to community-based alternatives.119 To be el-
igible for a reduced sentence under the DVSJA, a survivor-defendant must 
meet three requirements. First, the survivor-defendant must have been a vic-
tim of domestic violence120 at the time of the offense. Second, the abuse must 
have been a significant factor in producing the defendant’s offense.121 Third, 
the defendant’s previously imposed sentence must have been “unduly 
harsh.”122 To be eligible for resentencing, a survivor-defendant must meet 
these three requirements and be serving a sentence with a minimum or deter-
minate term of eight years or more.123 
Although the statutes discussed in Section II.B recognize the impact of 
trauma resulting from domestic violence and human trafficking, they do not 
do nearly enough to end the criminalization of survival. Part III examines 
these shortcomings through a comparison of the current approaches to do-
mestic violence and human trafficking. It then uses those observations to sug-
gest several much-needed statutory interventions. 
III. ENDING THE CRIMINALIZATION OF SURVIVAL 
What would a meaningful consideration of trauma look like in the con-
text of domestic violence and human trafficking? The domestic-violence and 
human-trafficking statutes discussed in Part II bring the law more in line with 
the current social-science research about trauma in these contexts.124 They 
also recognize that survivor-defendants’ offenses are driven by the abuse they 
experienced.125 By granting affirmative defenses, resentencing, habeas peti-
tions, and parole consideration to survivor-defendants, the statutes recognize 
that survivor-defendants need rehabilitation, not prolonged separation from 
their families and communities through incarceration.126 
Nonetheless, most of these reform efforts have major shortcomings that 
prevent meaningful relief. This Part explores those shortcomings through a 
 
 119. Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act, ch. 31, 2019 N.Y. Laws 144 (codified as 
amended at N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.47 and N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 60.12, 70.45 (McKinney 
Supp. 2021)); Cynthia Feathers, Domestic Violence Survivor-Defendants: New Hope for Humane 
and Just Outcomes, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N J., Mar. 2020, at 15, 16. 
 120. The DVSJA applies to domestic violence broadly, not just to IPV. N.Y. PENAL LAW 
§ 60.12(1) (McKinney Supp. 2021) (defining a victim of domestic violence as someone subjected 
to “substantial physical, sexual or psychological abuse” by a member of their family or house-
hold). “Family and “household” are defined as people related by blood or affinity, currently or 
formerly married partners, people with a child in common, and people not related by blood or 
affinity who are or have been in an intimate relationship. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 530.11(1) 
(McKinney Supp. 2021). 
 121. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.12(1). 
 122. Id. 
 123. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.47. 
 124. See Feathers, supra note 119, at 15, 16. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
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comparative analysis of the domestic-violence and human-trafficking stat-
utes. Using statutes and case studies, this Part explains how the criminal jus-
tice system fails domestic-violence and human-trafficking survivor-
defendants. It examines issues with current statutes, including their failures to 
provide an affirmative defense at trial, failures to provide for resentencing, 
limitations to certain offenses, limitations to crimes committed during the 
abuse or trafficking, and nexus requirements. It then argues that including 
only a modified nexus requirement as a limitation in future statutes is the op-
timal and politically attainable way to stop the criminalization of survival.127 
A. Provide an Affirmative Defense 
While many states have adopted an affirmative human-trafficking de-
fense, no such defense exists in the context of domestic violence. Thus far, the 
laws that increase consideration of domestic violence apply only after a con-
viction.128 But the criminal justice system must consider trauma resulting 
from domestic violence before the sentencing stage. Specifically, future stat-
utes should provide an affirmative defense to survivor-defendants as the hu-
man-trafficking statutes do.129 This would enable domestic-violence survivor-
defendants to avoid the negative consequences of a criminal conviction, in-
cluding the retraumatizing effects of incarceration. 
The California and Illinois domestic-violence laws apply only after the 
survivor-defendant has already been convicted and incarcerated for a period 
of time.130 Although none of the three laws granting broad relief to domestic-
violence survivor-defendants create affirmative defenses, several state statutes 
already provide an affirmative defense to specific categories of criminal charges 
for domestic-violence survivor-defendants. For instance, seventeen states 
 
 127. This intervention is intended as a stepping stone toward the abolition of the prison-
industrial complex. 
 128. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473.5(b) (West Supp. 2021) (“This section is limited to violent 
felonies . . . that resulted in judgments of conviction or sentence after a plea or trial as to which 
expert testimony . . . may be probative on the issue of culpability.”); id. § 4801(a) (West 2021) 
(“The Board of Parole Hearings may report to the Governor, from time to time, the names of 
any and all persons imprisoned in any state prison who, in its judgment, ought to have a com-
mutation of sentence or be pardoned and set at liberty on account of good conduct, or unusual 
term of sentence, or any other cause, including evidence of intimate partner battering and its 
effects.”); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-3.1(a)(15) (2020); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1401(a) (2020) 
(“Relief from final orders and judgments, after 30 days from the entry thereof, may be had upon 
petition as provided in this Section.”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.12(1) (McKinney Supp. 2021) 
(“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, where a court is imposing sentence upon a per-
son . . . the court . . . may instead impose a sentence in accordance with this section.”). 
 129. See supra Section II.B. 
 130. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1473.5, § 4801; 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-3.1(a)(15); 735 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/2-1401. 
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provide an affirmative defense for parental kidnapping when the alleged kid-
napper was fleeing IPV.131 In addition, several states have created an affirma-
tive defense to child endangerment if the defendant was a victim of IPV.132 
Furthermore, the human-trafficking statutes provide survivor-defendants 
with an affirmative defense. Domestic violence statutes do not provide affirm-
ative defenses despite the fact these statutes are driven by knowledge that 
trauma from domestic violence and human trafficking reduces the culpability 
of survivor-defendants.133 
The current discrepancy between human-trafficking and domestic-vio-
lence statutes lacks justification. Domestic violence and human trafficking are 
similar kinds of abuse.134 This abuse includes sex trafficking, forced participa-
tion in group crimes, forced commission of theft or other criminal offenses, 
economic abuse, restrictions on travel or work, and forced use of drugs or al-
cohol.135 Thus, domestic-violence and human-trafficking survivor-defend-
ants often experience the same kinds of coercive violence over the course of 
multiple or prolonged traumatic events. Similarly, survivor-defendants of do-
mestic violence and human trafficking may turn to substance abuse as a way 
of coping with physical and emotional pain.136 Given the parallels in their 
traumatic experiences and the impact of those experiences, the difference in 
legal responses is unjustified. 
To be sure, even an affirmative defense does not fully avoid dual victimi-
zation since survivor-defendants are treated as criminals before they can raise 
the affirmative defense at trial.137 But it is a start. An affirmative defense would 
spare domestic-violence survivor-defendants the negative consequences of 
 
 131. Cross, supra note 43, at 282. In Arizona, for example, a defendant has an affirmative 
defense to a charge under the parental-kidnapping statute if “[t]he defendant has begun the pro-
cess to obtain an order of protection or files a petition for custody . . . and the order of protection 
or petition states the defendant’s belief that the child was at risk if left with the other parent,” the 
defendant has the right of custody and is the child’s parent, and the defendant “[h]as a good faith 
and reasonable belief that the taking, enticing or withholding is necessary to protect the child 
from immediate danger” or “[i]s a victim of domestic violence by the other parent and has a 
good faith and reasonable belief that the child will be in immediate danger if the child is left with 
the other parent.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1302(C) (2020). 
 132. Cross, supra note 43, at 272–73, 272 n.80; see also, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 750.136b(10) (West Supp. 2020) (“It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under this sec-
tion that the defendant’s conduct involving the child was a reasonable response to an act of do-
mestic violence in light of all the facts and circumstances known to the defendant at that time.”). 
 133. Cf. NYS Bill and Veto Jackets: 2019, Chapter 31, N.Y. STATE ARCHIVES 6, https://digi-
talcollections.archives.nysed.gov/index.php/Detail/objects/85269 [perma.cc/8BMT-BPYW]  
(saying the purpose of the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act is to remedy “the unjust ways 
in which the criminal justice system responds to and punishes domestic violence survivors who 
act to protect themselves from an abuser’s violence”). 
 134. See supra Section I.A. 
 135. See supra Section I.A. 
 136. See supra Section I.A. 
 137. Blizard, supra note 2, at 646. 
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unjust incarceration and the collateral consequences of conviction.138 Since 
domestic-violence statutes do not provide affirmative defenses, survivor-de-
fendants are convicted and may spend years in prison for crimes inextricably 
linked to their own abuse before they can challenge the injustice of their con-
viction.139 These survivor-defendants are also burdened with the negative col-
lateral consequences accompanying their criminal convictions, such as 
barriers to securing housing, employment, public assistance, a driver’s license, 
and financial aid.140 
Spending time in prison denies people suffering from these kinds of 
trauma the care they need and oftentimes retraumatizes them. Between 32% 
and 66% of inmates experience physical victimization while in prison.141 In-
mates also experience sexual assault at extremely high rates.142 Creating an af-
firmative defense that forces courts to consider a defendant’s trauma resulting 
from domestic violence before the sentencing stage would help prevent this 
further harm. Like human-trafficking survivor-defendants, domestic-violence 
survivor-defendants have reduced culpability due to the connection between 
their crimes and their abuse and thus do not deserve to bear the negative con-
sequences that come with a criminal conviction. 
B. Allow for Resentencing 
Domestic-violence and human-trafficking laws should also explicitly al-
low for the resentencing of defendants who were unable to bring up their 
abuse at trial. As the California “Sin by Silence” laws recognized, evidence of 
IPV should be heard in all cases in which it might apply, even if the defendant 
has already been convicted and incarcerated for several years.143 Resentencing 
provisions are necessary because although the criminal justice system still of-
ten does not understand domestic violence and human trafficking or their im-
plications, it considered these issues even less in the past.144 In some cases, 
evidence of domestic violence was even excluded from the courtroom.145 As 
 
 138. See U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., supra note 4, at 1–3. 
 139. See supra Section II.C. 
 140. See U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., supra note 4, at 1–2. 
 141. Hattem, supra note 2, at 998. 
 142. See id. (reporting that 43% of Black male prisoners overheard a sexual assault during 
incarceration and 16% witnessed a fellow inmate being sexually assaulted); see also PA. COAL. 
AGAINST RAPE, FACTS ABOUT SEXUAL ASSAULT IN PRISON 1 (2013), https://pcar.org/sites/de-
fault/files/resource-pdfs/prea_facts_about_sexual_assault_in_prison.pdf [perma.cc/Y55F-F7TP] 
(“One in 10 former state prisoners reported one or more incidences of sexual victimization . . . .”). 
 143. Sin by Silence Bills, supra note 92. 
 144. Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica Choplin, Seeing the Wrecking Ball in Motion: Ex Parte 
Protection Orders and the Realities of Domestic Violence, 32 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 13, 63 (2017). 
 145. See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:482 (repealed 1988) (barring courts from even consid-
ering domestic violence in cases where there was no violent act toward the defendant at the time 
of the crime). Louisiana’s Code of Evidence now permits evidence about the effects of prior 
abuse if a survivor-defendant pleads self-defense and there is a history of abuse. LA. CODE EVID. 
ANN. art. 404(A)(2)(a), (B)(2) (2017). 
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discussed earlier, laws recognizing the pathways between human trafficking 
and criminal behavior also did not exist until 2005, leading to many unjust 
incarcerations of human-trafficking survivor-defendants.146 
C. Fewer Limitations on Types of Crimes 
An examination of domestic-violence and human-trafficking laws shows 
that limiting trauma defenses to only defendants who are charged with certain 
crimes ignores the reality of trauma in these contexts and criminalizes sur-
vival. Currently, two of the three domestic-violence statutes, and the vast ma-
jority of the human-trafficking statutes, are limited to a small range of eligible 
crimes. For example, the Illinois IPV law is limited to survivor-defendants 
who are convicted of a “forcible felony.”147 The California law similarly limits 
petitions for habeas corpus to those convicted of “violent felonies.”148 In con-
trast, New York’s DVSJA is not limited to the self-defense context, which 
means that it has the potential to provide more just sentences to domestic-
violence survivor-defendants who are forced to commit crimes by their abus-
ers or who turn to substances as a way of coping with abuse.149 The California 
and Illinois laws do not apply to those kinds of offenses.150 
There is also a great deal of disparity between human-trafficking statutes 
as to which offenses are eligible for an affirmative defense. All but eleven states 
limit the defense to prostitution and other sex-related crimes.151 Of the eleven 
that apply more broadly, six of those are also limited to certain offenses.152 
Limiting consideration of trauma to certain criminal offenses ignores do-
mestic violence and human trafficking’s effects. For example, human traffick-
ers trap and control their victims through threats, assaults, debt, shaming, 
isolation, and false promises.153 This atmosphere of control and abuse can lead 
victims of domestic violence and human trafficking to engage in criminal be-
havior in many ways, including forced commission of nonsexual crimes; using 
violence to protect themselves or others, or to escape their trafficker; and sub-
stance abuse.154 In the context of IPV, survivor-defendants may be falsely ac-
cused of kidnapping children when fleeing an abuser or convicted for failing 
to protect their children from their abuser.155 Limiting those who are eligible 
for relief to only those charged with violent crimes does not account for the 
 
 146. See supra text accompanying note 91. 
 147. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1401(b-5) (2020). 
 148. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473.5(b) (West Supp. 2021). 
 149. Feathers, supra note 119, at 15, 16–17. 
 150. See supra Part II. 
 151. See supra text accompanying note 94. 
 152. See supra text accompanying note 95. 
 153. Sex Trafficking, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Jan. 28, 2021), https://
www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/sexualviolence/trafficking.html [perma.cc/W347-ZHWW]. 
 154. See supra Section I.A. 
 155. See supra Section I.B. 
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many ways that domestic violence and human trafficking can lead to nonvio-
lent criminal behavior. 
In the context of human trafficking specifically, limiting the defense to 
only sex-related crimes ignores the plight of “bottom girls,” a term used to 
refer to the victim who has been with the trafficker for the longest amount of 
time and is therefore higher in the hierarchy of human-trafficking victims.156 
While bottom girls are sometimes the most abused of a trafficker’s victims, 
they are also used by their traffickers to commit trafficking crimes and shield 
the trafficker from liability.157 Several human-trafficking statutes recognize 
this dynamic by explicitly granting an affirmative defense to defendants who 
are charged with human trafficking but are also victims of human traffick-
ing.158 New statutes should not limit the range of eligible crimes in order to 
avoid criminalizing survival. 
D. Issues with Limitations Based on When the Abuse Occurred 
Trauma caused by domestic violence and human trafficking can have 
long-lasting effects that continue even after the abuse ends. For this reason, 
domestic-violence and human-trafficking statutes must apply to any crime re-
lated to a survivor-defendant’s abuse, regardless of whether the survivor-de-
fendant was experiencing abuse at the time of the crime or had experienced 
abuse in the distant past. Due to the potentially long-lasting effects of trauma 
in these contexts, no survivor-defendant should be prevented from invoking 
an affirmative defense because their offense did not occur while they were ex-
periencing abuse. Thus, future statutes should impose a nexus requirement 
instead of a temporal limitation.159 
Many of the current laws attempting to account for trauma in the context 
of domestic violence and human trafficking include rigid temporal require-
ments. For example, New York’s DVSJA only applies to survivor-defendants 
who experienced domestic violence “at the time of the instant offense.”160 The 
practical implications of this requirement are still unclear. One court has held 
that while the defendant does not have to be enduring abuse at the moment 
they commit the offense, abuse that occurred years earlier should not be given 
much weight.161 The California IPV laws and the Illinois domestic-violence 
 
 156. See Blizard, supra note 2, at 639–40. 
 157. Id. 
 158. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-43.16 (2019); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.269 (2019); S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 16-3-2020 (Supp. 2020). 
 159. See infra Section III.E. 
 160. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.12(1) (McKinney Supp. 2021). 
 161. People v. Addimando, 120 N.Y.S.3d 596, 619 (Dutchess Cnty. Ct. 2020) (stating that 
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whether the DVSJA’s temporal requirement is met); see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.12(1) (“[A]t 
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to substantial physical, sexual or psychological abuse inflicted by a member of the same family 
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law are similarly limited to survivor-defendants who were subject to domestic 
violence at the time of the offense.162 Human-trafficking laws are more forgiv-
ing. While some are also limited to offenses that occurred when the defendant 
was a victim of human trafficking,163 others have no time limitation at all.164 
Future statutes must extend past the time of active abuse in order to ac-
count for the long-lasting effects of trauma that might cause criminal activ-
ity.165 For instance, abusers may force or pressure their domestic-violence or 
human-trafficking victims into using drugs or alcohol in order to gain more 
control over them.166 This can result in addiction, which can have lasting ef-
fects even after the abuse ends.167 In addition, domestic-violence and human-
trafficking survivors often use substances to cope with physical pain, mental-
health problems, and emotional pain incurred from past abuse.168 In other 
words, both domestic violence and human trafficking can lead to substance-
related crimes that last after the abuse has ended. 
Moreover, the economic effects of domestic violence and human traffick-
ing can last well after the abuse is over. Since between 24% and 52% of survi-
vors lose at least one job due to IPV169 and human-trafficking victims are not 
paid for their labor, survivors of these two kinds of violence can be economi-
cally disadvantaged past the time of the abuse. Thus, survivors may turn to 
criminal behavior out of economic necessity, even after the abuse is over.170 
Domestic-violence and human-trafficking statutes must account for these 
long-lasting effects by not limiting coverage to offenses that happen during 
the period of abuse, as long as the offenses are related to the abuse. 
In the context of IPV, there are additional reasons to allow survivor-de-
fendants who committed an offense after leaving their abusive relationship to 
invoke an affirmative defense. Refusing to do so fails to account for the reali-
ties of IPV. Research has shown that the most dangerous time for someone 
 
 162. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4801(b)(1) (West 2021) (“The board, in reviewing a prisoner’s 
suitability for parole . . . shall give great weight to any information or evidence that, at the time 
of the commission of the crime, the prisoner had experienced intimate partner battering . . . .”); 
730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-3.1 (2020) (favoring reduction of a sentence if “[a]t the time of the 
offense, the defendant is or had been the victim of domestic violence”). 
 163. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 748(D) (Supp. 2020) (“It is an affirmative defense to 
prosecution for a criminal offense that, during the time of the alleged commission of the offense, 
the defendant was a victim of human trafficking.”). 
 164. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-708(a) (2021) (“A victim of human trafficking is not 
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of, or incident to, being a victim of human trafficking . . . .”). 
 165. See supra Section I.C. 
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 168. Wright et al., supra note 14, at 1616. 
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experiencing IPV is after they leave their abuser.171 In fact, 77% of homicides 
related to IPV occur after the relationship ends,172 and the risk that the survi-
vor will be killed by the abuser increases dramatically in the two-week period 
immediately after the survivor leaves the relationship.173 This risk of violence 
remains elevated for at least two years.174 Since there is an increased risk of 
violence after the relationship ends, there is a corresponding increased risk of 
the need to engage in self-defense. Statutes addressing trauma should account 
for this elevated risk by providing IPV survivor-defendants with an affirma-
tive defense, so long as their offense was related to their abuse. 
E. Nexus Requirements 
1. A Problem with Nexus Requirements 
Many domestic-violence and human-trafficking statutes currently im-
pose a nexus requirement under which a survivor-defendant must show a re-
lationship between their experience of abuse and the crime that they 
committed. For example, the DVSJA says that the abuse must be “a significant 
contributing factor to the defendant’s criminal behavior,”175 and many hu-
man-trafficking statutes are limited to scenarios when the offense is a “direct 
result” of being trafficked.176 But the meaning of “direct” is unclear. This 
leaves determining who is eligible for relief to judicial discretion, which is 
problematic since judges have different levels of understanding about domes-
tic violence and human trafficking. Thus, nexus requirements enable judges 
who are unaware of, or who simply ignore, the links between trauma and 
criminal offenses to refuse to grant statutory relief. 
For example, Nicole Addimando was convicted of intentional murder af-
ter killing one of her traffickers.177 Nicole presented compelling evidence, in-
cluding eyewitnesses and photographs, documenting years of severe, sadistic 
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sexual and physical abuse by multiple people.178 This included evidence that 
the man she killed subjected her to horrific abuse, including burning her 
vagina multiple times with a spoon heated on a stove, raping her with a bottle, 
whipping her, beating her, and telling her twice on the night of his death that 
he was going to kill her.179 
Nicole tried to invoke the DVSJA,180 but the judge refused to apply the 
statute to Nicole’s case, citing Nicole’s failure to provide enough evidence to 
prove that the abuse was a significant contributing factor to the crime.181 The 
judge highlighted that Nicole had shot her abuser while he was sleeping in-
stead of using that opportunity to escape.182 The judge’s decision ignored the 
reality that many people who experience IPV do not believe that they are able 
to successfully leave the relationship.183 This belief is justified: research has 
confirmed that personal danger significantly increases for those experiencing 
IPV after they try to leave the relationship.184 
Taylor Partlow’s case provides another example of a judge using the nexus 
requirement to unjustly deem a survivor-defendant unworthy of relief. Taylor 
was convicted of first-degree manslaughter and sentenced to eight years in 
prison after stabbing her abuser.185 Numerous witnesses confirmed that Tay-
lor was subjected to severe abuse at the hands of her boyfriend, including be-
ing dragged across the floor by her hair and beaten, choked in a car, verbally 
abused, and forced to accompany her abuser to his job so that he could see 
her.186 Immediately after the stabbing, Taylor was found naked and with a 
black eye, corroborating her self-defense claim.187 Nevertheless, the judge 
found that the abuse was not a significant contributing factor to the offense 
and declined to apply the DVSJA, calling the relationship “mutually abusive” 
and noting that Taylor had used cocaine prior to the stabbing.188 Not only 
does the judge’s reasoning fail to take the abuse that Taylor was subjected to 
seriously, it also fails to account for the links between IPV and substance 
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abuse.189 Taylor’s case illustrates the way in which nexus requirements allow 
judges to inconsistently and inappropriately determine who is “worthy” of a 
defense. 
The decisions in both these cases are also representative of the gender bias 
in the judicial system as a whole. As of 1996, thirty-one states had published 
studies finding that gender bias in the courts was an issue.190 Judges have been 
shown to generally view women as less credible and more likely to exaggerate 
than men.191 Judges are also influenced by myths about domestic violence, 
may not understand why people often do not leave their abusive relationships, 
and tend to doubt domestic violence survivor-defendants’ testimony.192 This 
shows that judges may not be able to appropriately apply a nexus requirement 
and may instead use it to deny relief to survivor-defendants based on their 
own implicit biases. 
2. Why a Nexus Requirement Is Desirable and How to Mitigate the 
Problem 
Part III has identified a number of common shortcomings in laws aimed 
at addressing the link between domestic violence, human trafficking, and 
criminal behavior. For reasons explained above, future domestic-violence and 
human-trafficking statutes should provide survivor-defendants with an af-
firmative defense and allow for resentencing. As shown, there are problems 
with the limitations existing statutes impose, but some kind of limiting prin-
ciple is necessary in order to ensure that these statutes benefit only the in-
tended population: survivor-defendants whose culpability is lessened because 
their crime is connected to their abuse. A single limitation is sufficient to 
achieve this goal since, as seen, multiple limitations deny relief to a larger 
number of survivors whom the statutes were intended to benefit. 
Although it also has problems, a nexus requirement is the most preferable 
limitation. As previously explained, both temporal limitations and restrictions 
to certain kinds of crimes exclude some survivor-defendants whose abuse is 
related to their offense. On the other hand, a nexus requirement ensures that 
all survivor-defendants who commit offenses related to their abuse will have 
an affirmative defense, at least in theory. Whether a survivor-defendant’s 
abuse is related to their offense is highly fact-dependent. Although it would be 
ideal if this inquiry could be conducted by the courts, the cases of Nicole 
Addimando and Taylor Partow suggest that courts are sometimes unable to 
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meaningfully address the impact of trauma related to domestic violence and 
human trafficking in their sentencing decisions.193 
In order to mitigate the potential harm of a nexus requirement, it is es-
sential for any new statute with a nexus requirement to also mandate judicial 
education. Because these statutes substantially expand judicial discretion, 
training is necessary to combat the apparent judicial bias against granting re-
lief to survivor-defendants.194 There must also be a mechanism for ensuring 
that judges are actually trained. After many jurisdiction-specific task forces 
found gender bias in the courts, some recommended judicial education as a 
way to ameliorate the problem.195 But even where education task forces were 
created, educational programs were not always implemented.196 New legisla-
tion granting survivor-defendants an affirmative defense could avoid this 
problem by specifying how and when judicial education will take place as part 
of the same piece of legislation. 
It is also essential for the nexus requirement to be carefully worded so that 
courts apply the affirmative defense broadly. For example, the Wyoming hu-
man-trafficking statute says that “[a] victim of human trafficking is not crim-
inally liable for any commercial sex act or other criminal acts committed as a 
direct result of, or incident to, being a victim of human trafficking . . . .”197 In-
cluding “or incident to” makes it clear that stealing due to an abuser’s eco-
nomic control or committing an offense related to controlled substances 
should be covered as long as it is related to the abuse experienced by the sur-
vivor-defendant. As discussed above, it does not make sense to exclude of-
fenses that some may deem to be less “directly” connected to abuse than 
others.198 The pathways discussed in Part I are inextricably linked to abuse and 
thus lessen the survivor’s culpability.199 Finally, human-trafficking statutes 
that already use this “or incident to” language show that this kind of nexus 
requirement is politically feasible and does not lead to widespread inappro-
priate application of the defense.200 
Including a nexus requirement will also make future domestic-violence 
and human-trafficking statutes more politically attainable. Existing statutes in 
these contexts limit eligibility to only certain kinds of crimes or impose tem-
poral or nexus requirements. This trend shows that some limiting principle is 
politically necessary in statutes granting relief to survivor-defendants. 
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CONCLUSION 
The wave of domestic-violence and human-trafficking statutes enacted 
over the past decade are a step toward creating a criminal justice system that 
accounts for the relationship between trauma in these contexts and culpabil-
ity. But current approaches suffer from critical shortcomings that deny survi-
vor-defendants meaningful relief. Comparing statutes from different states 
and different contexts reveals that future statutes addressing domestic vio-
lence or human trafficking must provide an affirmative defense at trial and 
allow for resentencing to meaningfully account for the effects of trauma on 
survivor-defendants. These statutes should also not limit the defense to a nar-
row list of eligible crimes or impose temporal limitations. Although there are 
issues with nexus requirements, future statutes should include a broadly 
worded nexus requirement accompanied by a judicial-education mandate. Oth-
erwise, the criminal justice system will continue to unjustly incarcerate survi-
vor-defendants, compounding their existing trauma instead of redressing it. 
